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THE EFFECTS OF TOP LEASING IN THE
LOUISIANA LAW OF OIL AND GAS
Patrick G. Tracy, Jr.*
In the oil and gas vernacular to toplease is to secure a lease on
land covered by an existing lease to the end that the toplease
will be effective after the expiration of the existing lease and the
interest of one or more leases thereby eliminated. Topleasing has
the same invidious characteristics as claim jumping.'
An old, seldom used exploration tool has come of age in the Loui-
siana oil and gas industry. Although once much maligned, as suggested
above by Judge Breitenstein of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the practice of "top leasing" has become a competitive necessity for
operators hoping to maintain or gain an acreage position in many of
the tightly-leased geologic provinces extending from the Tuscaloosa
Trend in South Louisiana to the Williston Basin in Montana.2 For many
of these operators, large and small alike, top leasing provides the only
effective way to gain a foothold in areas heavily leased by larger
operators and then "shelved" for a closer look near the end of the
primary or extended lease term.' When used in this manner, this
exploration tool often spurs increased drilling in areas of genuine
geologic interest, prompting operators toward earlier development of
their lease blocks in order to maximize their ability to preserve
valuable lease acreage which has been "topped."
Quite simply, a top lease is a lease acquired on a mineral interest
which is subject to a valid, existing prior lease. A top lease can be
created only when a prior lease is in existence and should be
distinguished from a "renewal lease," whereby an existing lessee may
acquire a second lease from the mineral owner while the first lease
is still in existence. The "renewal lease" is stipulated to take effect
only after the expiration of the term of the prior lease, and thus there
is no overlapping of lease terms.4
A top lease can exist in two situations, each producing distinct
legal effects. In the first situation, often referred to as the "two-party"
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, Louisiana Bar Association.
1. Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1960).
2. In the past, top leasing a competitor was considered by many an illegal and
immoral act of interference, speculating on the expiration of valuable lease rights in
others. For a perspective on the industry attitude, see Ernest, Topleasing-Legality
v. Morality, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 957 (1980).
3. See Brown, Effect of Top Leases: Obstruction of Title and Related Considera-
tions, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 213, 242 (1978).
4. Id. at 242 n.253.
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or "same-party" top lease, the same lessee (or his successor in title)
secures a second lease from the same lessor (or his successor in title)
covering all or part of the same interest, prior to the expiration of
the first lease. Used in this fashion, top leasing functions as one of
several devices available to an operator to preserve leasehold rights
in a situation where, for example, he is doubtful about the validity
of a former lease or his ability to preserve that lease in the face of
impending expiration. The legal effect of primary concern to the
operator in a "two-party" top lease situation is novation. In the second
situation, generally referred to as the "third-party" top lease, the
original lessor (or his successor in title) executes a subsequent lease
in favor of a lessee who is a title stranger to the first lessee. The
legal effect of primary concern in the "third-party" top lease situa-
tion is obstruction of title, usually commencing with the disturbance
in law of the possession of the first lessee.
The practice of top leasing is neither proscribed by the Louisiana
Mineral Code nor regarded as invalid in the jurisprudence of this state.
As a legal right, the top lease exists at its inception as a mere hope
or expectancy in the extinction of existing superior leasehold rights,
which extinction will confer upon the top lease owner the essence
of a mineral lease, i.e., the right to explore for and produce minerals.
As such, "the top lease is analogous to the situation in which a land-
owner who has already sold minerals attempts to convey his rever-
sionary right to the outstanding minerals."' Unlike the top lease,
however, under the Louisiana law, the reversionary right is not an
object of commerce This anomaly appears justified by the manner
in which the conveying of these oil and gas interests accords with
the civilian policy that encumbrances not keep immovables from com-
merce for long periods of time, a policy grounded in title simplicity
and security in transfers of land (or mineral rights therein).' Sale of
the reversionary right would introduce into mineral titles an entirely
new interest apart from the outstanding mineral interest, permitting
a landowner to circumvent the public policy of this state that, in the
absence of use, the right to explore for oil, gas, and other minerals
revert to the landowner after a period of ten years. Furthermore,
if frequently transferred and divided, such an interest would severely
5. Comment, The Top Lease and the Reversionary Right in the Louisiana Law
of Oil and Gas, 18 LA. L. REV. 300, 301 (1958).
6. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:76 & 31:104 (1974); Hicks v. Clark, 225 La.
133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
7. This policy is expressed by the Louisiana Mineral Code in articles 27 (mineral
servitude), 85 (mineral royalty), and 115 (mineral lease). See Comment, supra note 5,
at 311-12.
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complicate mineral titles. While a top lease complicates mineral titles
to some degree, safeguards inherent in the nature of the interest con-
ferred by top lease, as opposed to the interest conferred by rever-
sionary right, preclude severe disruption of title. Once the drilling
rights vest, the top lease carries with it many operating respon-
sibilities which must be performed in order to preserve the leasehold
interest over the stipulated term.' Thus this interest is far less likely
to be the subject of numerous transfers by speculators, and the prop-
erty can not be taken out of commerce for an extensive period of
time without exercise of the exploration and development rights con-
ferred in the lease.
SAME-PARTY TOP LEASE: NOVATION
In Placid Oil Company v. Taylor,9 the Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal ruled that an oil, gas, and mineral lease entered into
by a lessor as to mineral rights subject to two prior leases granted
by his predecessors in title to the same lessee effected a novation
of the prior leases, extinguishing those leases as to the affected
mineral interest and substituting the latest lease in their place. The
top lease was granted for a royalty of twice that of the original, or
bottom, leases and included previously unleased mineral rights
acquired by the lessor in the lands affected by the bottom leases. The
top lease contained no provision regarding its effect upon the former
leases granted by the lessor's predecessors in title.
Novation is the conventional transformation of an existing obliga-
tion into another obligation which is substituted in its place.1" Nova-
tion may be express or tacit, but it is not presumed. Accordingly,
the determining factor in establishing novation-the intent of the
parties-cannot result from equivocal acts susceptible of construction
for or against novation, but must readily appear from examining the
character of the transaction, the facts and circumstances surrounding
it, or the terms of the agreement itself." In finding the requisite in-
tent to novate, two major considerations of the court of appeal in
Placid were the absence of specific reference in the top lease to the
existence of the prior leases affecting the same property, particularly
in light of the substantial increase in the royalty payable to the lessor
8. Consider, for example, the offset well obligation, the drilling or production
obligation in the secondary term, and the implied obligations of exploration and
development.
9. 325 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), writ denied, 329 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976).
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2185.
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2190; Placid Oil Co. v. Taylor, 325 So. 2d at 316.
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under the top lease, 2 and an appropriate motive of the parties to sup-
port the intent to novate - the inclusion in the top lease of an addi-
tional fractional mineral interest not covered by the earlier leases. 3
Curiously, no mention is made in Placid of Stacy v. Midstates Oil
Corp.," an earlier Louisiana Supreme Court decision involving a "same-
party" top lease. At issue in Stacy was whether the same lessee's
taking of top leases in 1937 covering a portion of the lands affected
by a prior existing lease taken in 1919 evidenced an intent on the
part of the lessee to effect a novation of the prior lease. Although
there was an express provision in the top leases stipulating that they
superseded the preexisting leasehold contracts affecting the leased
property, the court deemed such recital in the top leases insufficient,
of itself, to support an intent to abandon the bottom lease. Each top
lease contained the following provision: "21. This lease shall supersede
the present oil and gas leasehold contracts of The Ohio Oil Company
affecting the above described lands .... ,,,5 No mention is made in
the reported opinion of any additional consideration delivered to the
lessors under the top lease as evidence of their intent to abandon
the bottom lease. The court noted that the only evidence introduced
to reflect the intent to abandon the bottom lease as to the "topped"
acreage was the above quoted provision in each lease which was
deemed insufficient, standing alone, to support the intent to abandon.
The court stated:
Nor do we consider the taking of the top leases as being entirely
12. It is inconceivable, we think, that the parties would omit a reference to the
1964 leases, if they actually intended that the lessee was to pay only a one-eighth
royalty on the production from the Watson and Pap C. Taylor mineral interests
instead of the one-fourth royalty provided in the 1965 lease covering the same
interests.
325 So. 2d at 317.
13. When the court of appeal first heard the case, it applied the literal language
of Louisiana Civil Code article 2190 and reached the opposite result, concluding that
novation could not be presumed by the mere execution of a top lease which did not
by express provision indicate an intent to extinguish the bottom leases or to substitute
in their place a new lease of those interests with a higher royalty. See Placid Oil Co.
v. Taylor, 313 So. 2d 626, 629 (La. App. 3d Cir.), denial of rehearing vacated and matter
remanded, 318 So. 2d 40 (La. 1975). On remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court,
the court of appeal, citing French doctrinal sources, gave broader application to article
2190, noting that the intent to novate may be shown by the nature of the contract
made and by the external circumstances of the transaction, as well as by the agree-
ment itself. See 325 So. 2d at 316. See generally 6 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FRANCAIS S 324 (6th ed. Bartin 1942) in A. YIANNOPOULOS, 1 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS
228 (1965).
14. 214 La. 173, 36 So. 2d 714 (1947).
15. 214 La. at 185, 36 So. 2d at 718 (quoting from the terms of the top leases).
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inconsistent with the continued existence of the original lease. It
is a matter of common knowledge that lessees often take top leases
when they are doubtful about the validity of a former lease,
without intending to impeach the title of a former lessor, or to
surrender their rights under any former lease which may turn
out to be valid.1"
The court remanded the case to receive further evidence on
whether the lessee, by taking the top leases, had abandoned all rights
under the original lease. However, affirming exceptions of no cause
and no right of action on rehearing, the court pretermitted further
resolution of the novation issue. The statements of the supreme court
in Stacy are difficult to reconcile with the reasoning of the court of
appeal in Placid. Perhaps the Placid court, when establishing the
intent to novate the prior leases, placed undue significance on the
inclusion in the top lease of the formerly unleased mineral interest.
Notably, however, the top lease in Placid was taken only eleven
months after the commencement of the term of the bottom lease, and
there was little evidence in the record to suggest that the top lease
was taken out of concern over the validity or impending expiration
of the bottom lease. Nonetheless, the supreme court denied certiorari
in Placid, reflecting its approval of the result reached by the lower
court.
After Stacy and Placid, it appears clear that the mere execution
of a top lease in favor of the same lessee will not of itself result in
novation under Louisiana law and the language of the instrument itself
is but one of several factors to consider in finding an intent to novate,
unless, of course, the novation of the original lease agreement is
expressly stipulated in clear and unmistakable terms. If the common
purpose of top leasing in the situation is protection,17 the mere execu-
tion of a top lease, silent as to its effect on the existing lease, should
not result in the extinction of the original lease by novation. 8 It is
certainly unreasonable in such event to assume the lessee's intent to
abandon a bottom lease generally carrying a greater net revenue in-
16. 214 La. at 186, 36 So. 2d at 718.
17. Top leasing is commonly used to preserve a lessee's acreage position in a
prospect near the end of the primary term of the bottom lease, often in the face of
pending drilling operations or compulsory unitization proceedings affecting the leased
tract or offsetting acreage and often at the expense of a substantially increased lease
royalty burden.
18. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 21: "In all civil matters, where there is no express
law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably,
an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive
law is silent."
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terest to him when such lease might on the occurrence of an uncer-
tain event be maintained in whole or part beyond its primary term. 9
Nonetheless, it is logical to assume that the lessor intends a substitu-
tion of leases in such circumstances, unless the limitation of the effect
of the top lease is expressly stipulated, since the lessor usually has
far less to gain by the granting of such an "insurance" lease. Placid
suggests that the better policy would place the burden of clarifying
the nature and intent of the transaction on the lessee, who negotiates
and usually drafts the top lease agreement, with the inference favor-
ing novation when the agreements are silent. In light of this inference,
operators using the top lease in this fashion should proceed with
caution.
A collateral novation problem is also frequently encountered with
the "same-party" top lease. Often a top lease is taken not by the
original lessee but by another operator in privity of contract with
the original lessee either by assignment, sublease, or pursuant to the
terms of a farm-out or joint venture agreement. In order for novation
to operate on the original lease in such circumstances, the novation
must take place in two steps: (1) a new debtor is substituted for the
old debtor through a transfer of interest in the bottom lease, with
the consent and approval of the creditor, and (2) the substitute debtor
contracts a new debt (top lease) to his creditor, which new debt is
substituted for the old one, which is extinguished."0 Under article 128
of the Louisiana Mineral Code, to the extent of the interest acquired,
an assignee or sublessee acquires the rights and powers of the lessee
and becomes responsible directly to the original lessor for the perform-
ance of the lessee's obligations. Therefore, a form of novation may
result from the substitution of a new debtor (i.e., the assignee or
sublessee) by such assignment or sublease when the creditor (i.e., the
lessor) consents thereto.21 This kind of novation can occur with the
consent of the lessor to the delegation by the assignor 2 or even
19. See Brown, supra note 3, at 237.
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2189.
21. Difficulties are presented, however, in the absence of an assignment or sublease,
when there exist in the lessee taking the top lease only operating rights under a farm-
out agreement entitling such lessee to earn an assignment or sublease after successfully
complying with certain drilling obligations. With no contractual obligations flowing
directly from such lessee to the lessor under the bottom lease agreement, there can
be no novation of the lease.
22. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2192 provides: "The delegation, by which a debtor gives
to the creditor another debtor who obliges himself towards such creditor, does not
operate a novation, unless the creditor has expressly declared that he intends to
discharge his debtor who has made the delegation."
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without the concurrence of the assignor (i.e., the original or former
debtor)," provided in all cases it proceeds from the lessor's discharge
of the original lessee from the assigned obligations under the bottom
lease.2"
Difficult legal questions arise when a sublessee owns, as is often
the case, full operating rights in the bottom lease, but subject to an
overriding royalty interest reserved by his sublessor which is con-
vertible at a subsequent point in time to a working interest in the
bottom lease. Can the sublessee under such circumstances effect a
novation of the original lease by his unilateral execution of a top lease
agreement with the original lessor? If article 128 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code permits a sublessee to release the base lease in full
to the original lessor and thereby extinguish the rights of his
sublessor, it certainly follows that a sublessee can effect a novation
of the original lease by the execution of a top lease.2 5 Further, articles
2189, 2191, and 2192 of the Louisiana Civil Code support the proposi-
tion that if the original lessee assigns his full operating rights under
the lease retaining only a passive interest in production therefrom,
a sublessee holding such operating rights can operate, with the con-
sent and approval of the original lessor to the lease, a kind of ex-
promission (i.e., a substitution of debtors to the obligations of the
lessee) and novation of the original lease which would not require con-
currence of the original lessee.
THIRD-PARTY TOP LEASE: OBSTRUCTION OF TITLE
A mineral lessor is bound to deliver the leased premises for use
by the lessee and to refrain from interference with his lessee's
possession." The mineral lessor may breach his covenant of peaceful
possession and obstruct the operations of his lessee by his unequivocal
(and unwarranted) repudiation of the lease or his challenge to the
exercise of his lessee's lawful operating rights thereunder. Such
repudiation may take the form of physical acts of interference with
the lessee's operations on the premises, a formal declaration by the
23. This latter substitution of lessees is recognized by Civil Code article 2191
and embodies a kind of subjective novation known in French and Roman law as ex-
promission. See generally 6 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 13, S 324, in A. YIAN-
NOPOULOS, at 229.
24. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:129 (1974).
25. It is not clear, however, that article 128 of the Louisiana Mineral Code em-
powers a sublessee to act in this manner. See Plauche, The Impact of the Louisiana
Mineral Code on Oil, Gas and Mineral Leases (pt. 1), 22 INST. ON MIN. L. 107, 114-17
(1975).
26. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:119 (1974)
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lessor of the termination of the lease and a demand for release of
same, or, in certain circumstances, the granting to a third party of
a top lease which purports to be presently effective. When such
obstruction of title occurs and causes a failure on the part of the lessee
to comply with the terms of the lease, the lessee generally is not
forced to suffer the loss of the lease as a result of the hindrance;
instead, he is granted an extension of time in which to comply with
his obligations." The effects of obstruction of title vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions, including Louisiana,28 hold that
the obstruction serves to toll the lease term, thereby allowing the
lessee an extension for the period of time which was remaining under
the original lease term when the obstruction came into existence.
Other jurisdictions allow the lessee, once the obstruction is removed,
such additional period of time as is reasonable under the
circumstances."
Among common law jurisdictions, there appears to be a divergence
of views regarding the extent to which top leasing constitutes an
obstruction of the existing lessee's title. A lessor's granting of a top
lease, for example, has been held to constitute an election to declare
the existing lease at an end, thereby clouding the title of the original
lessee and obstructing such lessee's exercise of his leasehold rights."
Another view affirms the right of the landowner to execute an oil
and gas lease covering land that is already subject to an unexpired
prior lease without repudiating the title of the original lessee. The
latter view recognizes that if the first lease is valid and binding, the
subsequent lessee cannot interfere with operations thereunder until
the prior lease is terminated.3 Often the matter is resolved by the
use of limiting language in the top lease (e.g., "subject to" the prior
27. In Williams v. James, 188 La. 884, 178 So. 384 (1938), the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated:
There is no reason why the lessor should be allowed to deprive the lessee of
a part of the term of his lease by withholding possession of the leased premises
without just cause. It has been decided, with regard to oil and gas leases, that,
if the lessee is prevented by a lawsuit from beginning operations within the time
stipulated, he is entitled to an extension for the time of such hindrance, if he
is successful in the lawsuit.
188 La. at 891, 178 So. at 386.
28. See Baker v. Potter, 233 La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (1952); Knight v. Blackwell
Oil & Gas Co., 197 La. 237, 1 So. 2d 89 (1941); Fomby v. Columbia County Dev. Co.,
155 La. 705, 99 So. 537 (1924).
29. See Ernest, supra note 2, at 964-65, and authorities cited therein.
30. Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
31. See Jennings v. Elliott, 186 Okla. 285, 97 P.2d 67 (1939).
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lease) that operates to negate an intention in the lessor to repudiate
title to the bottom lease.2
As noted by one author, "[t]he essence of the doctrine [of obstruc-
tion of title] . . . is that a lessor by his actions has unequivocally
declared a particular lease to be terminated so that the lessee cannot
reasonably be expected to take any further steps to develop the
mineral estate or continue production."3 One might reasonably con-
clude that the execution by a lessor of a top lease purporting to be
presently effective and warranting title thereto represents by implica-
tion a declaration by the lessor that the existing lease is at an end.
However, when such a top lease is granted without the knowledge
of the lessee under the existing lease, no operating right or interest
is openly asserted thereunder, and the top lease is not recorded until
after the first lease has expired, the top lease generally is not regarded
as an obstruction to the continuing operations of the lessee under the
bottom lease. 4 Moreover, some jurisdictions place the burden upon
the lessee of the bottom lease to prove actual notice of the existence
of the top lease and detrimental reliance thereon in suspending
operations."
An early Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Standard Oil Co. v.
Webb,36 recognized that a lessor has no power to prejudice the rights
of his lessee by conveying those rights to a third party, noting that
a lessor has nothing to sell save an interest contingent upon the failure
of the parties to the earlier recorded lease to comply with their respec-
tive obligations. If the prior recorded lease is valid and subsisting,
the subsequent lessee is precluded from unlawfully interfering with
the rights of the original lessee. Furthermore, Louisiana procedural
law permits the owner of the bottom lease, without the concurrence,
joinder, or consent of the owner of the land, to assert, protect, and
defend his leasehold rights in the same manner as one would assert,
protect, and defend the ownership or possession of other immovable
property." Thus, in order to be maintained in his possession of the
leased premises and his enjoyment of his leasehold operating rights
when he has been disturbed in the exercise thereof or in order to
be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he has been
32. For a general review of the common law authorities, see Brown, supra note
3, at 215-31.
33. Brown, supra note 3, at 215-16.
34. Ernest, supra note 2, at 963.
35. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hilton, 437 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
36. 149 La. 245, 88 So. 808 (1921).
37. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3664 & comment.
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evicted, the bottom lessee is entitled to maintain a possessory action
provided he allege and prove, among other things, a disturbance of
his possession either in fact or in law.' Under article 3659 of the Loui-
siana Code of Civil Procedure, a disturbance in fact requires an evic-
tion or any other physical act which prevents the possessor of the
mineral lease from enjoying his possession quietly or which throws
any obstacle in the way of his enjoyment. A disturbance in law is
the execution, recordation, registry, or continuing existence of record
of any instrument which asserts or implies a right of ownership or
right to possession of immovable property or a real right (e.g., a
mineral lease) or which asserts or implies any claim or pretension
of ownership or right to the possession thereof (e.g., a top lease which
purports to be presently effective) except in an action or proceeding
adversely to the possessor of such property or right.
Although the foregoing indicates that the simple execution and
recording of a top lease is a disturbance in law of the possession of
the leasehold estate of the bottom lessee, this disturbance does not
automatically create an obstruction of title in the sense heretofore
discussed. Indeed much of the Louisiana jurisprudence on obstruction
of title suggests that something more is required either by the distur-
bance in fact of the quiet and peaceful possession of the lessee by
actual eviction by the original lessor by obstructing access or use
rights under the prior lease, by formal declaration to the lessee that
the former lease is deemed terminated and the institution of litiga-
tion thereon, or by actual trespass by operation of the top lessee
on the premises." Whether the mere execution and recordation of a
top lease, standing alone, constitutes an obstruction of title such as
to suspend the obligations of the lessee under the bottom lease is
not specifically addressed in any reported Louisiana decision. However,
the jurisprudence clearly indicates that the disturbance in law of the
possession of the bottom lessee resulting from the execution and
recordation of a top lease is not sufficient to strip the right of posses-
sion of such lessee, since to interrupt such right of possession, the
disturbance must bring home to the actual possessor the realization
that his dominion is being seriously challenged." Thus, judicial ap-
plication of obstruction of title theory to "third-party" top leasing
38. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3658.
39. See Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (1952); Standard Oil Co. v.
Webb, 149 La. 245, 88 So. 808 (1921); Leonard v. Busch-Everett Co., 139 La. 1099, 72
So. 749 (1916). But see Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044, 81 So. 2d
389 (1955).
40. See Pitre v. Tenneco Oil Co., 385 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Chauvin
v. Kirchhoff, 194 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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should turn on a case by case basis, looking to such factors as actual
notice to the bottom lessee of the existence of the conflicting top lease
and the extent to which the actions or assertions of the original lessor
and top lessee with respect to the preexisting lease might reasonably
be expected to deter the bottom lessee in the conduct of his subse-
quent operations on the lease.
CONCLUSION
Top leasing can provide protection to an existing lessee when faced
with possible extinction of his lease rights near the end of the primary
term. Top leasing also can provide a competitor the opportunity to
gain an acreage position in a tightly-leased prospect upon the termina-
tion of an existing leasehold. In either case, some undesired legal con-
sequences may follow from the standpoint of the top lessee (and his
lessor) unless appropriate caution is exercised.
If a "same-party" top lease is involved, an operator should con-
sider the possibility of novation, with the concomitant extinction of
his preexisting leasehold contracts. Where appropriate, the operator
should act to avoid this consequence by inserting in his top lease
express provisions recognizing the prior lease and acknowledging that
the top lease is taken subject and subordinate to all subsisting rights
and obligations of lessor and lessee under the bottom lease.
From the standpoint of the lessor, the granting of a "third-party"
top lease can result in his liability to a bottom lessee for breach of
the covenant of peaceful possession4 (whether the disturbance be one
in law or in fact) when the top lease purports to be presently effec-
tive and does not properly recognize the superior rights of the existing
lessee. The top lease also may establish an obstruction of title to the
operating rights of the bottom lessee which could suspend or toll the
existing lease term until the obstruction is removed. From the stand-
point of the top lessee, the execution and recording of a top lease
purporting to be presently effective creates a disturbance in law
entitling the bottom lessee to a possessory action to remove the distur-
bance and provides the framework for obstruction of title to be inter-
posed as a defense to an action seeking cancellation of the bottom
lease (for the bottom lessee's failure to continue operation). To preclude
such exposure and the resulting cloud on the title to the lease rights
at the expiration of the bottom lease, a top lessee (and his lessor)
should consider including language in the top lease acknowledging that
the lease is granted subject to the prior existing lease and that the
41. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:120 (1974).
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top lessee shall not interfere with the existing lease or exercise any
rights of entry, use, or possession until the existing lease has expired
by its terms. 2 Furthermore, the top lessee should secure from his
lessor a convenant that he shall execute no agreements to renew or
extend the terms of the prior existing lease.
The hostile attitude of the oil industry in the past toward the
practice of "third-party" top leasing has by no means wholly abated,
and an operator would still be wise to consider the practical effects
of a decision to top lease on future business dealings with the bottom
lessee. The moderation in the oil and gas operator's perspective on
top leasing, however, has been an inevitable consequence of today's
highly competitive oil and gas market in which top leasing, if properly
and cautiously used, can be an invaluable and often essential explora-
tion tool.
42. For suggested language and alternative conveyancing techniques, see Ernest,
supra note 2, at 972-80.
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